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## FAR EAST

## INDOCHINA

Ho's Orientation Although Moscow-trained Ho Chi Minh has never been proven to be either a Tito-like nationalist or a Moscow-dominated Communist, recent developments may indicate his subservience to the Kremlin. Broadcasts from the Hocontrolled radio in Indochina have reportedly attacked Tito and failed to mention the diplomatic recognition extended by the Yugoslav Government to the Ho regime. French authorities have also reported that Ho is on his way to Peiping and Moscow to sign treaties of alliance with Mao Tse Tung and Stalin. Ho's brief flirtation with Yugoslavia regarding recongition may have been the result of a mistake by his Bangkok representative, who made the initial approach to Tito along with a general invitation to all nations.

## CURRENT SOVIET TACTICS IN GERMANY

Current Soviet tactics in Germany reflect both the Kremlin's growing optimism regarding its improved world power position and its increased confidence in gaining eventual control over all of Germany on Soviet terms. These tactics are characterized by an uncompromising designation of the East German regime as the sole focal point of German unity and by Soviet insistence upon political progress toward the establishment of a Peoples Democracy in East Germany. This Soviet attitude is evident in: (1) the demand for absolute acceptance of the National Front policy of German unity through friendship with the USSR; (2) consistent reiteration by East German political officials that the Oder-Neisse boundary is permanent, and their acceptance of the recent Polish decision to evict the German minority; and (3) the purge of the bourgeois parties in East Germany. The USSR is unlikely to change its present tactics as long as the Kremlin does not foresee participation of West Germany in an effective political and military Western bloc.

The USSR is unlikely to conclude a separate peace treaty with the East German Government (GDR) in the near future unless the Western Powers sign a separate peace agreement with West Germany. The USSR could, however, take action short of a formal peace treaty, such as a declared termination of the state of war. Any advantages accruing to the USSR from a separate peace treaty at this time would be limited to propaganda and the enhancement of the prestige of the National Front and the GDR. Moreover, the conclusion by the USSR of a separate treaty with East Germany would weaken the Soviet claim,

based on the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, to a voice in West Germany and the Ruhr. The Kremlin may also be reluctant to conclude a separate peace treaty in the belief that it would lead to the alignment of West Germany with a Western political and military bloc.

Continuation of present Soviet tactics in Germany will lead to further political consolidation in East Germany resulting, for all practical purposes, in a one-party system by the time of the scheduled October 1950 elections. At the same time, continued efforts will be made to expand and strengthen the East German internal security force. The USSR is unlikely to undertake actual troop withdrawal or rectification of the Oder-Neisse line, in order to enhance Soviet-Communist appeal in Germany. The current Soviet attitude toward the German problem, combined with continued harassing actions in Berlin, also reduces the likelihood of an early Soviet offer to reopen Four Power negotiations on Germany. The city of Berlin will remain a "special situation" for the USSR and will probably be subjected to increased economic and political pressure in the near future.